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CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
KINGS COUNTY
People v. Kuffuor-Afriyiel
(decided July 21, 2009)
Eric Kuffuor-Afriyie was arrested and "charged with four
counts of Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree . .. and one count of En-
dangering the Welfare of a Child." 2 He made a pre-trial motion to
dismiss3 claiming that the complaint, as supplemented by the Bill of
Particulars, violated provisions of the New York Criminal Procedure
Law4 ("CPL"), "the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion,5 and [Article I, Section 6 of] the New York Constitution." 6
More specifically, he contended that the accusatory instrument was
defective because it did not provide him with reasonable and ade-
quate notice of the charges, thereby hindering his ability to plead a
defense or protect his double jeopardy rights.' Judge Gerstein of the
' 2008KNO72116, 2009 WL 2184367, at *1 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2009).
2 Id. (internal citations omitted). See also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (1) (McKinney
1990) ("A person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a child when: He knowingly acts in
a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child less than
seventeen years old .... ); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.55 (McKinney 2001) ("A person is
guilty of sexual abuse in the third degree when he or she subjects another person to sexual
contact without the latter's consent .....
Kuffuor, 2009 WL 2184367, at *1.
4 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.40 (McKinney 1985) provides, in pertinent part: "An in-
formation, or a count thereof, is sufficient on its face when: The allegations ... provide rea-
sonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged in the accusatory
part of the information ... ." See also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.45 (McKinney 1982)
("The provisions of section 200.95, governing bills of particulars with respect to indictments,
apply to informations, to misdemeanor complaints and to prosecutor's informations.").
5 U.S. CONST. amend. VI, states, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right ... to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation . . . ."
6 N.Y. CONST. art I, § 6, states, in pertinent part: "In any trial in any court whatever the
party accused ... shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation .... No person
shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense . . . ." Kuffuor, 2009 WL
2184367, at *1, *2.
7 Kuffuor, 2009 WL 2184367, at *3.
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Kings County Criminal Court8 relied on well-established New York
law when he considered the constitutional sufficiency of the accusa-
tory instrument.9 Analyzing the matter "on an ad hoc basis,"o Judge
Gerstein found no violation of Kuffuor-Afriyie's statutory or consti-
tutional rights, and denied his motion to dismiss."
In August 2007, a sixteen-year-old girl 2 was sexually abused
after a visit to church with her family.' 3 While driving her home
from choir practice between February and May of the following year,
the perpetrator repeated his opportunistic lewd attacks on H.B. three
more times.' 4
Kuffour-Afriyie was arrested and "charged with four counts
of Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree and one count of Endangering
the Welfare of a Child."'" Following his arrest and indictment, he re-
quested that the government produce a Bill of Particulars containing
specific dates and occurrences of the alleged offenses.16 After con-
ducting several interviews with the complainant, the government was
able to ascertain that the first offense was committed "on an after-
noon after [H.B.'s] family had taken her to church, and [that] the
second, third, and fourth offenses occurred after the complainant at-
tended choir practice and the Defendant drove her home."' Howev-
er, the government could not specify the exact dates or times of the
offenses.18 The defendant made a pre-trial motion to dismiss the
complaint arguing that the accusatory instrument was overly broad
because it did not afford him sufficient notice of the charges to enable
him to "adequately prepare and conduct a defense," and therefore,
Id. at *1.
9 See generally Kuffuor, 2009 WL 2184367.
10 Id at *4.
" Id at *5.
12 Id. at *1, *2 n.1 (considering the age of the victim and the nature of the offense, the
court attributed to the Complainant a fictitious name, "H.B."). See also N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS
LAW § 50-b (1) (McKinney 2006) ("The identity of any victim of a sex offense . .. shall be
confidential.").
" Kuffuor, 2009 WL 2184367, at *4. The complaint alleged that "the Defendant . . .
touched ... the ... Complainant's breasts and buttocks." Id. at *1.
14 Id at *4.
" Id. at *2.
16 Id.
17 Kuffuor, 2009 WL 2184367, at *4.
18 Id. at *2.
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failed to protect him from a future prosecution for the same offense.19
Also, he contended that the government's failure to particularize the
date and time of the alleged offenses was unreasonable and unjusti-
fied as the government could have identified more specific dates and
times if it had acted with "due diligence." 20 In opposition, the gov-
ermnent argued that the four distinct one-month and two-month time
periods, 21 amplified by other events in the Bill of Particulars, "estab-
lish[ed] a frame of reference" in determining the alleged time spans
that was not unreasonably excessive as to deprive the defendant of
the opportunity to prepare a defense.22
The court recognized the fundamental significance of the con-
stitutional requirement " 'to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation,' ,23 but noted that the government is not legally man-
dated to plead a single date when, as in this case, "time is not a[] [ma-
terial] element of [the] crime."24 Moreover, the issue of whether the
time periods of the alleged misconduct as set forth in the indictment
provide a criminal defendant with reasonably sufficient notice of the
charges against him as to afford him his constitutional rights is left to
the court's interpretation, and is generally resolved "on an ad hoc ba-
sis" by taking all relevant facts and circumstances into considera-
tion.25
In reaching his conclusion, Judge Gerstein evaluated the age
and intelligence of the complainant, her "ability . . . to particularize
the date and time of the alleged . . . offense," the nature of the of-
fense, and how much time had passed between the alleged criminal
act and the arrest or indictment.26 After balancing these factors,
19 Id. at *3.
20 Id. at *4.
" Id. at *1.
22 Kuffuor, 2009 WL 2184367, at *2.
23 Id. (quoting People v. Morris, 461 N.E.2d 1256, 1259 (N.Y. 1984)).
24 Id. at *2. See also People v. Oglesby, 787 N.Y.S.2d 401, 403 (App. Div. 3d Dep't
2004) (" '[W]hen the period of time is not an essential element of any of the charged crimes,
an approximation of time is satisfactory.' " (quoting People v. Johnson, 703 N.Y.S.2d 545,
546 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2000))).
25 Kuffuor, 2009 WL 2184367, at *4. See also People v. Sedlock, 869 N.E.2d 14, 17
(N.Y. 2007) ("[T]he 'determination of whether sufficient specificity to adequately prepare a
defense has been provided to a defendant by the [accusatory instrument] and the bill of parti-
culars must be made on an ad hoc basis by considering all relevant circumstances.' " (altera-
tion in original) (quoting Morris, 461 N.E.2d at 1259)).
26 Kuffuor, 2009 WL 2184367, at *3.
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Judge Gerstein decided that two one-month and two two-month long
time frames were not per se unreasonable.27 In fact, voluminous legal
authority demonstrates that comparable time periods are reasonably
specific.28 Furthermore, the indictment against Kuffuor-Afriyie con-
tained "the nature of the charges, the conduct underlying them, the
place of the crimes, the witnesses present, and the time of the offense,
within a reasonably designated period." 29 Accordingly, the court held
that the accusatory instrument provided adequate and reasonable no-
tice, and therefore, comported with both "Federal and State Constitu-
tions." 0
In addition, the court noted that the government is under no
obligation to verify the schedule of the complainant's choir practice,
medical appointments, or church attendance.31 If the defense proper-
ly investigated the facts and circumstances surrounding the allega-
tions, it would have been "able to obtain information as to dates and
times of church services and choir practice with the same ease or dif-
ficulty as would the [government]." The judge reasoned that Kuf-
fuor-Afriyie's request went "far beyond the specificity required in a
Complaint or Bill of Particulars."33 Furthermore, he equated the de-
fendant's request with "pre-trial discovery . .. in a civil case," and re-
fused to place such a burden on the government. 34 Therefore, he de-
nied the motion to dismiss.
A criminal defendant is entitled "to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation" against him.36 This right is guaranteed
27 Id. at *5.
28 See, e.g., People v. Case, 814 N.Y.S.2d 272, 273 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2006) ("[T]wo-
month intervals [in the case of rape and incest] were reasonably specific and provided the
defendant with adequate notice."); Oglesby, 787 N.Y.S.2d at 403-4 (holding one, two, and
three-month periods " 'sufficiently adequate to comport with . . . due process' . . . pro-
vid[ing] defendant with sufficient notice to prepare a defense" (quoting People v. Keefer,
692 N.Y.S.2d 233, 234 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1999))).





34 Kuffuor, 2009 WL 2184367, at *5.
36 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See also Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 766 (1962)
(condemning "[a] cryptic form of indictment" because it forces "the defendant to go to trial
with the chief issue undefined," allows "his conviction to rest on one point and the affir-
894 [Vol. 26
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by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and is an
imperative part of fundamental fairness and procedural due process.
Sufficiency of notice is particularly important in criminal cases be-
cause an individual's personal liberty is at stake. Courts have inter-
preted and analyzed the constitutional adequacy of notice under a
two-pronged test.37 First, the indictment or information must fairly
and "sufficiently apprise[] the defendant of what he must be prepared
to meet," thereby enabling him to present a defense against the
charges.3 8 Second, the charges must be sufficiently pleaded to avoid
any future prosecution for the same crime, which protects the defen-
dant against double jeopardy. In United States v. Cruikshank, the
United States Supreme Court reiterated that these goals can be
achieved if the facts, and not only conclusions of law, are stated
"with reasonable particularity of time, place, and circumstances." 4 0
In addition, the Court did not focus solely on the defendant's rights as
it recognized that criminal charges pleaded with reasonable specifici-
ty benefit the government and the courts as well.4 1 For over a cen-
tury, federal courts have successfully employed these criteria in de-
termining the sufficiency of the constitutional notice requirement.4 2
In 1999 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided United
mance of the conviction to rest on another," and "gives the prosecution [a] free hand on ap-
peal to fill in the gaps of proof by surmise or conjecture"); United States v. Simmons, 96
U.S. 360, 362 (1878) ("[T]here is the qualification, fundamental in the law of criminal pro-
cedure, that the accused must be apprised by the indictment, with reasonable certainty, of the
nature of the accusation against him."); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 557-58
(1876) ("[T]he indictment must set forth the offence 'with clearness and all necessary cer-
tainty, to apprise the accused of the crime with which he stands charged.' " (quoting United
States v. Mills, 32 U.S. 138, 142 (1833))).
37 Russell, 369 U.S. at 763.
38 Id. at 763. In order to meet this standard " '[t]he indictment or the information shall be
a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense
charged.'" Id. at 762 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 7 (c) (1) (2009)).
39 Id. at 764; Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 558; Valentine v. Konteh, 395 F.3d 626, 631 n.1 (6th
Cir. 2005).
40 Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 558.
41 Id. ("[Inform[ing] the court of the facts alleged ... [allows] it [to] decide whether they
are sufficient in law to support a conviction."). See also Russell, 369 U.S. at 769 n.15
("[A]nother purpose served by the indictment is to inform the trial judge what the case in-
volves, so that, as he presides and is called upon to make rulings of all sorts, he may be able
to do so intelligently.") (citation omitted).
42 Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 558. See also United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483, 487 (1888).
2010] 895
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States v. Walsh,43 which concerned the sufficiency of notice, particu-
larity in the indictment." In Walsh, Norvin Fowlks was an inmate at
Orleans County jail in Albion, New York between January 1 and 12,
1991; January 18 and February 19, 1991; and May 26, 1992 and Jan-
uary 20, 1993. At all times herein, John Walsh was a corrections of-
ficer at that facility.4 5 According to the indictment, Walsh, standing
six-foot-two-inches tall and weighing over three hundred pounds,
stepped on Fowlks's "penis on a date between January 4, 1991 and
March 8, 1991 . . . . [S]ometime between May 26, 1992, and De-
cember 1, 1992 .... [And] sometime between May 26, 1992 and Ju-
ly 22, 1992."46 After a jury trial, Walsh was found guilty of the will-
ful deprivation of a person's constitutional rights "while acting under
color of law."47 He appealed the conviction and argued, inter alia,
that the government "failed to provide him with adequate notice of
the conduct charged" and "failed to protect him against double jeo-
pardy."48 Walsh contended that the time periods in the indictment
were overly broad and that the charges were "fatally multiplicitous
and/or duplicitous." 4 9 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals relied
upon the criteria set forth in Russell v. United States in determining
whether Walsh was given reasonable opportunities to plead his de-
fense and protect himself against double jeopardy.50 After reviewing
the whole record, the court found that the government's Bill of Parti-
culars disclosed "the names of each witness to each count," explained
the reason for each date range and particularized the location and the
facts of each alleged act.51 Additionally, witness testimony clearly
made every count distinguishable from the others. For example, the
offenses charged in the first and second counts took place in a differ-
ent jail cell than the offense charged in the third count.52 Moreover,
43 (Walsh I), 194 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1999).
4 Id. at 40.
45 United States v. Walsh (Walsh l), 27 F. Supp. 2d 186, 188-90 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
46 Walsh II, 194 F.3d at 40-41.
47 Id. at 40.
48 Id. at 41.
49 id
0 Id at 45.
' Walsh H, 194 F.3d at 41.
52 Id. at 41-43. According to witness testimony, the conduct described in the first and
second counts occurred in a cell that had no toilet-sink while the offense described in the
third count took place in a cell with a toilet-sink. Id.
896 [Vol. 26
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the witnesses observed the victim in different body positions during
two different instances of the assault." Furthermore, extra details
provided by the witnesses gave the defendant reasonable grounds to
differentiate the separate incidents of assault and to prepare separate
defenses. 54
In Walsh, the court gave serious consideration to the issue of
double jeopardy. Even though Walsh was more concerned about be-
ing prosecuted twice for the same crime in the same case rather than
in a later prosecution, the court analyzed "the sufficiency of the in-
dictment, because minimizing that risk is a primary aim of the suffi-
ciency requirements." Again, the court concluded that the facts
provided in the indictment by the government were sufficient to en-
sure that the defendant was not punished twice for the same act.56
The court used the same reasoning to conclude that the charges were
not multiplicitous or duplicitous." Based on this reasoning, the court
concluded that the indictment and the Bill of Particulars provided the
defendant with adequate notice of the charges against him, and there-
fore, withstood constitutional muster.
In Valentine v. Konteh, Michael Valentine was charged with
and prosecuted for "[twenty] ... counts of child rape .. . and [twen-
ty] counts of felonious sexual penetration" of his stepdaughter who
5 Id. The victim was lying on the floor in the third count, but in a kneeling and standing
positions begging for a cigarette in the first and second counts respectively. Id.
14 Walsh II, 194 F.3d at 41-43. The government distinguished the occurrences of criminal
conduct by providing the following specifics: (1) one instance occurring following a wit-
ness's "holiday break at the Police Academy;" (2) Fowlks having "a bandage on his hand" at
the time of the third incident after a visit to the medical center on June 5, 1992; and (3) the
existence or absence of a toilet-sink fixture in the cell where the alleged misconduct oc-
curred. Id.
5 Id. at 44 n.5.
56 Id. at 45.
5 Id. at 46. The court noted that
even on its face, the Indictment is not clearly multiplicitous. . . . Counts
II and III are at least somewhat distinguished from one another by the
body position of the victim, as well as by different, but overlapping time
frames. Moreover, the evidence presented at trial confirmed that: (1) the
cells in Counts II and III were different; (2) the incident alleged in Count
III occurred after June 5, 1992; and (3) Fowlks was standing during the
incident alleged in Count II, while he was lying on the floor during the
incident alleged in Count III.




Boudakova: Criminal Court of the City New York, Kings County - People v. Kuf
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2010
TOUROLAWREVIEW
was eight years old at the time of the alleged abuse.59 The indictment
alleged that the purported acts occurred during a ten-and-a-half
month period.60  After a jury convicted Valentine of "all [forty]
counts [of sexual abuse], . . . [he was] sentenced to [forty] consecu-
tive life [sentences]." 6' Valentine filed and was granted a writ of ha-
beas corpus on the grounds that the Ohio Court of Appeals' decision
that the indictment was constitutionally sufficient was " 'an unrea-
sonable application of [] clearly established Federal law.' "62 The
crux of Valentine's challenge was that his trial and ultimate convic-
tion were a result of a defective indictment that did not specify or dis-
tinguish the dates or the conduct of the alleged forty separate criminal
acts.63 Moreover, Valentine argued that he was unable to present an
alibi defense against the vague accusations and was not protected
against double jeopardy because he did not receive sufficient notice
of the charges against him.64
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals gave significant weight to
a criminal defendant's constitutional right to fair and adequate notice
when it stated that the notice requirement applies in both federal and
65state prosecutions. In reaching its determination, the court relied on
Russell and Cruikshank for guidance. 66
In Valentine, however, the court came to a different conclu-
sion and found that the charges were not sufficiently pleaded to meet
the Russell notice standard. 67 Notably, the court did not find a prob-
lem with "the wide date range" provided in the indictment when it
s Valentine, 395 F.3d at 628, 629.
60 Id. at 629. Specifically, the indictment stated that the acts "occurred between March 1,
1995 and January 16, 1996." Id.
61 Id at 629.
62 Id. at 630 (quoting 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (d) (1) (1996)).
63 Valentine, 395 F.3d at 630.
64 id
65 Id. at 631. See also Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948). The United States
Supreme Court in Cole stated that
[n]o principle of procedural due process is more clearly established than
that notice of the specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial of
the issues raised by that charge, if desired, are among the constitutional
rights of every accused in a criminal proceeding in all courts, state or
federal.
Id
6 Valentine, 395 F.3d at 630, 631 n.1.
67 Id. at 636, 638.
898 [Vol. 26
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agreed with the government's position that it is nearly impossible to
establish the exact dates and times with specificity in sexual abuse
cases involving young victims. 68 Generally, children do not remem-
ber precise dates and times, especially in cases of repeated abuse. In
addition, they are emotionally traumatized, sometimes threatened,
and often want to forget about the abuse instead of remembering the
details. Furthermore, because of embarrassment, they do not report
the abuse for a long time. In some instances, many years pass before
the sexual misconduct is discovered. It is unreasonable to expect the
child to remember the exact dates of the specific instances of the
abuse. 69 In reaching its conclusion, the Valentine court made refer-
ence to several child abuse cases where broad time frames were held
not to be violative of "constitutional notice requirements."7 o
Rather than dismissing the indictment based on constitutional
notice standards, the court dismissed thirty-eight counts in the in-
dictment because the government made no distinctions "within each
set of [twenty] counts." The forty counts contained in the indict-
ment were simply a "carbon-copy" of two criminal charges-child
rape and felonious sexual penetration.72 Accordingly, the defendant
could only be prosecuted, tried and convicted of the commission of
"two criminal acts that occurred twenty times each, rather than [] for-
ty separate criminal acts."73 The court held that the defendant was
over-convicted and was "likely subjected to double jeopardy in his
68 Id. at 632.
69 Id.
70 Id.; see, e.g., Isaac v. Grider, No. 98-6376, 2000 WL 571959, *1, *5 (6th Cir. May 4,
2000) (finding that a period of four months was sufficiently narrow to satisfy the "adequate
notice" requirement); Parks v. Hargett, No. 98-7068, 1999 WL 157431, *2, *4 (10th Cir.
Mar. 23, 1999) (holding that a sixteen-month time period was not overly broad, but was suf-
ficient to satisfy the constitutional requirements "of a fair trial [and] due process"); Fawcett
v. Bablitch, 962 F.2d 617, 618-19 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that a six-month time frame "af-
forded [the defendant] notice sufficient to permit him to defend against the charge [of unlaw-
ful sexual contact]"); Hunter v. New Mexico, 916 F.2d 595, 597, 600 (10th Cir. 1990) (re-
jecting the defendant's argument that the information that charged him with criminal sexual
penetration of a thirteen-year-old child during a period of three years "was deficient in fail-
ing to identify specific dates for the crimes alleged") (citation omitted); Madden v. Tate, No.
85-3061, 1987 WL 44909, *1, *1, *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 30, 1987) (finding that a six-month time
period constituted "sufficient notice of the charges").
" Valentine, 395 F.3d at 632.
72 Id. at 638-39.
7 Id. at 632.
2010] 899
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initial trial."74 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals set aside Valen-
tine's conviction of thirty-eight undifferentiated counts, but sustained
his conviction on the two counts that were sufficiently pleaded and
proven at trial.75
Judge Ronald Lee Gilman dissented from part of the majori-
ty's opinion and heavily criticized its reasoning.76 He viewed child
sexual abuse offenses as having a continuing nature.77  As such, un-
der the majority's holding, the offenders could not be prosecuted and
tried for multiple sexual acts committed against children unless the
victim could remember the date, time, and specific details for each
incident. 78 According to Judge Gilman, "[s]uch an outcome is con-
trary to judicial precedent and is not constitutionally required." 79 Al-
so, in response to the government's case, Valentine could have pre-
sented an alibi "about his daily whereabouts or . . . his relationship
with the little girl" to the jury.80 With respect to the double jeopardy
claim, Judge Gilman noted that it applies only to future prosecutions
for the same conduct and not to identical charges in the same indict-
ment.81 Finally, Judge Gilman viewed the majority's position that the
defendant committed only two criminal acts as repugnant to common
sense and public policy. 82  Such reasoning "fails to appreciate the
harm done to the victim from each successive criminal act." 83
74 Id. at 636.
7 Id at 628-29, 638-39.
76 Valentine, 395 F.3d at 639 (Gilman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
n Id at 640.
78 Id at 641.
7 Id.
80 Id. ("The effect of failing to recall time and place details is a matter appropriately as-
sessed by the jury, not a per se rule.").
81 Valentine, 395 F.3d at 642.
82 id.
83 Phil Telfeyan, Comment, Sexual Violence, Counting to Twenty, and the Metaphysics of
Criminal Acts: An Analysis of Valentine v. Konteh, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 493, 499
(2006). The author discusses the continuing nature of sexual abuse in the context of the Va-
lentine case when he states:
From the victim's point of view, it was not one criminal act. Just as the
first rape resulted in unimaginable injuries, both physical and non-
physical, so too did the second rape, and the third rape, and each subse-
quent rape. By regarding Valentine's conduct as a single crime, the ma-
jority ignores the immense harm done to the victim. Thus, from the vic-
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New York courts have developed a better-structured frame-
work for determining the degree of particularity of charges that is
needed in an accusatory instrument to withstand constitutional scruti-
ny. The principal element of the analysis is whether the government
conducted a reasonably diligent and thorough investigation in an ef-
fort to ascertain specific information as to the dates, times, and other
details of the alleged offense.84 In People v. Morris, the New York
Court of Appeals utilized a "reasonableness test" instead of a bright-
line rule and advanced a non-exclusive list of factors for courts to
consider when evaluating the government's effort in providing ade-
quate notice.ss First, the court stated that "the age and intelligence of
the victim and other witnesses" are of great importance.86 Second,
the courts should look at all of "the surrounding circumstances."
Finally, the court noted that "the nature of the offense" alleged plays
an integral role in the analysis.88
In Morris, the defendant was indicted "for rape and sodomy,
each in the first degree." 89 The government alleged that the defen-
dant had sexual intercourse with a six-year-old child who lived in his
home, and engaged in deviate sexual intercourse with his own five-
year-old daughter in November 1980.90 The government subsequent-
ly filed a Bill of Particulars, which narrowed the dates of the criminal
acts and specifically stated the location where they were committed.91
In response to the government's alibi demand, Morris maintained that
he could not provide an alibi because he did not know what specific
dates and times to provide. 92 Shortly thereafter, he "moved to dis-
84 Kuffuor, 2009 WL 2184367, at *3. See also Morris, 461 N.E.2d at 1260 ("Reasonable-
ness and fairness demand that the indictment state the date and time of the offense to the best
of the [government's] knowledge, after a reasonably thorough investigation has been under-
taken to ascertain such information.").




89 Id. at 1257.
90 Morris, 461 N.E.2d at 1257.
9' Id. The Bill of Particulars specified that the acts of rape and sodomy occurred at the
defendant's residence" 'on or about and between Friday, November 7, 1980 and Saturday,
November 30, 1980.'" Id.
92 Id. at 1258.
2010] 901
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miss the indictment." 93 He based his argument on the fact that the
time span of the alleged crimes was overly broad. More specifically,
he claimed that such deficiency "deprived [him] of adequate notice
guaranteed under the Federal and State Constitutions," denied him
the ability to present a defense, and stripped him of his constitutional
double jeopardy rights.94 Both the Cattaraugus County Court and the
Appellate Division, Fourth Department, agreed with the defendant's
propositions and dismissed the criminal action against him.95 How-
ever, the New York Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the in-
dictment.96 The court reasoned that the victims, who "were only five
and six years" of age, would be unlikely to provide the specific dates
and times involved.97 Additionally, both children "resided in the de-
fendant's home," which made it increasingly difficult for the gov-
ernment to delineate one day from another.98 Furthermore, rape and
sodomy are the crimes likely to reoccur and unlikely "to be discov-
ered immediately."99 Based on these factors, the court held that the
government exerted diligent efforts in ascertaining the relevant dates
and times of the criminal acts.'00
The court then proceeded with the inquiry of whether the pe-
riod of time provided in the accusatory instrument was reasonable.'
The determination of this question required the court to consider a
number of factors, which include:
[(1)] [T]he length of the alleged period of time in rela-
tion to the number of individual criminal acts alleged;
[(2)] the passage of time between the alleged period
for the crime and [the] defendant's arrest; [(3)] the du-
ration between the date of the indictment and the al-
leged offense; and [(4)] the ability of the victim or
complaining witness to particularize the date and time
93 Id
94 Morris, 461 N.E.2d at 1258.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 1261.
97 Id. at 1260.
98 id
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of the alleged .. . offense.102
The evidence showed that the "[d]efendant was arrested
[twelve] days after the end of the [alleged] period," and was indicted
five months after the alleged criminal conduct occurred.103 In addi-
tion, since "[t]he dates [were] not material elements of the crimes,"
the court rightfully concluded that a twenty-four day period was not
per se unreasonable.104
The standards and factors articulated in Morris have since
been widely adopted and applied in similar cases not only in New
York but also in other jurisdictions. 0 5 A large number of cases that
followed Morris have benefited from Judge Cook's decision.
In People v. Keindl, the defendant was "[c]harged in a [thirty-
two]-count indictment with . .. sodomy, sexual abuse and endanger-
ing the welfare of a child." 06 The defendant's eight, nine and eleven-
year-old stepchildren complained of sexual abuse that occurred for
"approximately three years."10 7 The children testified that their step-
father would generally come into their bedroom between three and
six o'clock in the morning, wake one of them, and force a sexual act
on that child.'08 The acts were also committed in the afternoon and in
the evening when the mother was not home. 109 All of the alleged acts
took place inside the house.'"
Following a jury trial, Keindl was convicted of only twenty-
102 id.
103 id
'0 Morris, 461 N.E.2d at 1260. But see Sedlock, 869 N.E.2d at 15-17 (finding a seven-
month time frame in the allegations of the forcible touching of a sixteen or seventeen-year-
old intelligent boy was unreasonable); People v. Beauchamp, 539 N.E.2d 1105, 1106 (N.Y.
1989) (holding a period greater than nine months excessive, because of the young ages of the
victims and regardless of the government's diligent efforts); People v. Aaron, 850 N.Y.S.2d
790, 792 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 2008) (stating that twelve months for a charge of sexual abuse
in the third degree of a thirteen or fourteen-year-old victim was unreasonable, but a four-
and-one-half-month period was not excessive).
105 See, e.g., People v. Van Hoek, 246 Cal. Rptr. 352 (Ct. App. 1988); State v. Mulkey,
560 A.2d 24 (Md. 1989); People v. Naugle, 393 N.W.2d 592 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); State v.
Hass, 566 A.2d 1181 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988).
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six of the thirty-two counts contained in the indictment."' After the
appellate division affirmed his conviction, Keindl appealed to the
New York Court of Appeals claiming that the indictment failed to
state the time of the alleged criminal acts with sufficient specifici-
ty.112 The twenty-six counts charged the defendant with offenses that
occurred during a two-year period."'3 Although the government was
able to narrow several counts to one month and six weeks, it could
not specify the number of acts because, according to the children, the
abuse would take place three to four times a week.114
The crux of the government's argument was a "continuing
crime" theory, but the court refused to apply it.115  The court con-
cluded that sodomy and sexual abuse are "single act" crimes.116
Therefore, they do not fit within the "continuing crime" category."
On the other hand, the crime of "[e]ndangering the welfare of a child
... is a crime that by its nature may be committed either by one act or
by multiple acts and readily permits characterization as a continuing
offense over a period of time."" 8 Accordingly, the court dismissed
the fifteen counts of sodomy and sexual abuse that were not pleaded
with specificity, but sustained "those counts charging the [defendant
with] the crime of endangering the welfare of a child."' '9
Twenty-three years after Morris, the New York Court of Ap-
peals was presented with a similar issue in People v. Sedlock, which
involved forcible sexual touching.120 In Sedlock, the defendant ar-
gued for dismissal of the information against him on the grounds that
it failed to provide him with proper "notice of the charge[s]" and pre-
' Keindl, 502 N.E.2d at 579 ("The jury acquitted [Keindl] of six counts of sodomy.").
112 Id 578, 579.
"3 Id at 580-81 ("For example, count [seven] charge[d] sodomy in the first degree by
forcible compulsion ... occurring over a period of approximately one year between August
1, 1981 and July 21, 1982."). Other counts alleged considerably shorter periods of time. Id.
114 id.
" Keindl, 502 N.E.2d at 581. The court explained that "[t]his theory would permit re-
peated acts of sexual molestation on young children within the family to be treated as 'one
continuous crime' . . . ." Id. This is exactly what Judge Gilman was so disturbed about in
the Valentine case. See Valentine, 395 F.3d at 641.
116 Keindl, 502 N.E.2d at 582.
117 Id.
1 Id. (citation omitted).
12 Idl
120 Sedlock, 869 N.E.2d at 15.
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vented him from "adequately prepar[ing] a defense." 12' Again, the
court analyzed the sufficiency of the notice under the good-faith test
furthered in Morris.
The defendant in Sedlock "was convicted of forcible touch-
ing" and sentenced to one year imprisonment.122 The information
charged Sedlock with the inappropriate touching of a seventeen-year-
old boy,123 whom he had befriended while working as a "scoutmaster
for a Boy Scout troop." 24 Their relationship developed to the extent
that the boy moved into the defendant's home and resided there
"from December 2002 to July 2003.",125 The defendant was accused
of forcibly touching the boy's private parts on at least one occasion
during the one year and six months that the boy had lived with him.126
The information did not provide any further specifics.127 The court
recognized that Morris requires the government to conduct " 'a rea-
sonably thorough investigation,' " and provide the specifics of the
charged criminal act " 'to the best of [its] knowledge.' "l28 In reach-
ing its conclusion, the court recognized that the government had am-
ple opportunity to narrow the time frame as the victim who provided
the government with the information about the alleged abuse was an
intelligent sixteen or seventeen-year-old child at the time the offense
was committed. Based on the government's failure to narrow the
time period, the court held that "seven months cannot be deemed rea-
sonable when weighed against the imperative notice rights of the de-
fendant." 29
In People v. Case the Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ment, evaluated the same factors when the government charged the
defendant with a particular crime over a "specified two-month pe-
riod."' In holding that a two-month period was "reasonably specific
and provided the defendant with adequate notice" the court consi-
121 Id. at 16.
122 id
123 Id. at 15-16.
124 Id. at 15.
125 Sedlock, 869 N.E.2d at 15.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 15-16.
128 Id. at 17 (quoting Morris, 461 N.E.2d at 1260).
129 id.
130 814 N.Y.S.2d 272, 273 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2006).
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dered the age and intelligence of the complainant, the repetitive na-
ture of the offenses, and "the continuous and long-term nature of the
abuse."l31
It is apparent that courts have been reluctant to draw a bright
line as to what time frame is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional no-
tice requirement. The importance of the individual's right to fair and
adequate notice of the charges sometimes pre-empts the govern-
ment's attempts to punish criminal defendants, mainly child abusers.
New York made a prudent step in establishing a more definite stan-
dard to rely on when evaluating "time-of-offense allegations." Under
the United States Constitution, it is still unclear what is considered
reasonable notice so that the defendant has the opportunity to defend
against the charges and avoid double jeopardy. It seems that federal
courts lack such a guideline, which is why the court in Kuffuor-
Afriyie did not even look at federal precedent for guidelines but in-
stead relied on New York jurisprudence. 132 Although the court might
have avoided scrutinizing the issue under federal standards because if
it found that the one and two-month periods were sufficiently narrow
under the New York standard, it would most certainly have come to
the same conclusion if it had applied the broader federal test. There-
fore, such scrutiny was unnecessary.
Anna V Boudakova.
132 See generally Kuffuor II, 2009 WL 2184367.
906 [Vol. 26
16
Touro Law Review, Vol. 26 [2010], No. 3, Art. 17
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol26/iss3/17
